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In Re Seagate: Did it Really Fix the Waiver Issue?
A Short Review and Analysis of Waiver Resulting
from the Use Of a Counsel’s Opinion Letter as a
Defense to Willful Infringement
INTRODUCTION
This past summer the Federal Circuit, responding to a writ of
mandamus, attempted to fix the quagmire nearly a quarter century in
1
the making that started with Underwater Devices and culminated most
2
recently in In re Echostar. In particular, the court sought to definitively
determine the various consequences of an assertion of willful
infringement by a patentee. Principally, should a party’s assertion of an
advice-of-counsel defense in response to a patentees contention of
willful infringement extend waiver of the attorney-client privilege and
work product immunity to communications with the defense’s litigation
3
counsel?
Ironically, Echostar—which instigated the writ of mandamus—itself
was an attempt by the Federal Circuit to resolve uncertainty
surrounding the extent of a waiver of attorney-client privilege—
subsequent to the disclosure of an attorney opinion letter as a defense to
a willful infringement of a patent. Instead, Echostar led to greater
confusion, particularly among the district courts.
A global analysis of waiver of privilege and immunity is beyond the
scope of this Paper. What is of most concern to this author is only one
of the questions addressed by the court: whether the production of an
opinion letter not only waives privilege with regard to opinion counsel,
but even encroaches on the work product immunity of an unaffiliated
4
trial counsel.
1. Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudson Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (1983)
2. In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006) [hereinafter
EchoStar].
3. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
4. Note that the concerns regarding the eroding nature of attorney-client privilege in
the face of increasing waiver are not limited to patent law. See, e.g., Mini-Conference on
Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine: Hearing Before the Advisory
Comm. on Evidence Rules on Proposal 502 (2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/advcomm-miniconference.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2006). See also Griffin B. Bell et
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Those courts that allow for the aforementioned waiver to extend to
trial counsel base their rulings on the concern that a determination of
willfulness requires an understanding of the complete environment of
the putative infringer, including the information that he or she is getting
from his or her counsel. If an infringer uses counsel’s advice implying
that he or she was not infringing as a defense to willfulness, it stands to
reason that the court should examine all of the potential opinions that
he or she received relating to willfulness to ascertain the true mindset of
5
the infringer, including those opinions of trial counsel.
This expansive notion of waiver, adopted by numerous courts
leading up to the Seagate decision is somewhat problematic. Not only
does it chill frank discussion between a defendant and her lawyer, but it
perversely incentivizes potential infringers to limit the scope and
breadth of their understanding vis a vis the infringement at hand. The
fewer attorneys involved in determining infringement, the better. The
putative infringer is better off getting an opinion letter and never
discussing the issue ever again even with other counsel for fear that their
conversation and work product will become available to the patent
holder. It also incentivizes patentees to claim willfulness on any
occasion given the huge payoff it can provide: either the defendant
provides a an opinion letter, opening up a treasure trove of formerly
privileged documents, or the defendant chooses to retain her privilege
and take her chances with the willfulness claim. If she loses she may be
liable for treble damages.
al., Letter to Attorney General Gonzales re Proposed Revisions to Department of Justice Policy
Regarding Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine, available at
http://www.abanet.org/media/docs/ag_sept52006.pdf.
5. Outside the Box Innovations, LLC v. Travel Caddy, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1378
(N.D. Ga. 2006) (“the EchoStar decision held that if a defendant relies on the advice-ofcounsel defense with respect to advice received from in-house counsel, then the waiver of
attorney-client privilege applies to advice ‘relating to the same subject matter’ received from
other counsel”). See, also, Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Simple.com, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 77077 (E.D.N.Y., Oct. 20, 2006).
The Special Master's holding that the waiver extends to trial counsel is consistent
with EchoStar. . . . [Which] held that “all opinions received by the client relating to
infringement must be revealed, even if they come from defendants' trial attorney.” .
The supporting citation to Akeva in describing the scope of the waiver, together
with the reasoning of the Echostar Court, indicates to this Court that the Federal
Circuit would extend the waiver to all attorneys who provided advice, including, in
the case of ongoing infringement, trial counsel. Excluding trial counsel from the
scope of the waiver would permit a party to use the attorney-client privilege as both
a sword and shield by allowing a party to choose which opinions are disclosed and
which are not.
(citations omitted).
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This Comment outlines the basic issues of privilege and immunity,
presents the history of uncertainty regarding waiver leading up to the
recent Seagate decision, examines the potential outcome of the decision,
and presents possible resolutions to further resolve the issue and more
fully repair attorney-client privilege and immunity. One caveat, the
ubiquitously inaccurate and inconsistent usage of the terminology
related to privilege and immunity serves only to confuse the issue and
the courts, and potentially this author. Establishing a consistent usage
of the terms used in court cases and in the literature may be a start to
reaching a clear, consistent, and fair rule.
I. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Attorney-client privilege is an integral component of our adversarial
legal system; despite its importance the bounds of the right continue to
6
7
remain unclear. While its exact historical origins are unknown —it is
8
either a utilitarian, social-good justification or a moral rights concept —
the right in its current incarnation in the U.S. judicial system stems from
9
statute and legislation; it is not as of yet seen as a constitutional right.
In 1972, the Supreme Court proposed a series of privileges to be
10
codified. The mere suggestion of codification drew such passionate
criticism, it nearly destroyed the entire process of evidentiary rule
11
revision. Thus, instead of any particular sets of privilege rules, the
Rules of Evidence state succinctly, “the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by
the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
6. See In re Application of Sarrio, S.A., 119 F.3d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 1997) (“While the
privilege confers important social benefits, it also exacts significant costs. It runs counter to
the ordinary judicial interest in the disclosure of all relevant evidence.”) But see Daniel R.
Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 33 (1998) (“Confidentiality
rules—the ethical duty of confidentiality, the attorney-client privilege, and the work product
doctrine—benefit lawyers but are of dubious value to clients and society as a whole. Absent
some more compelling justification for their existence than has been advanced to date, these
doctrines should be abolished.”).
7. See, e.g., United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 873 (4th Cir. 1984) (noting
Roman law roots).
8. See, e.g., Developments in the Law—Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1450, 1501 (1985).
9. "Standing alone, the attorney-client privilege is merely a rule of evidence; it has not
yet been held a constitutional right." Clutchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir.
1985).
10. Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second Chance—Testimonial Privileges
and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 769 (2002).
11. Id. at 769-70.
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courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.”
According to later interpretations by the Supreme Court, this
terminology reflects Congress’s “affirmative intention not to freeze the
law of privilege. . . . [and] to ‘provide the courts with the flexibility to
13
develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis.’”
Importantly, the Court, in formulating the bounds of attorney-client
privilege, rejected any balancing or other tests that could create
uncertainty in the application of the principle of attorney-client
privilege, noting “participants in the confidential conversation ‘must be
able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular
discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which
purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the
14
courts, is little better than no privilege at all.’”
In outlining the privilege, the courts have determined that
[t]he privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the
privilege is or sought to be come a client; (2) . . . (b)[t]he
attorney] in connection with this communication is acting as a
lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the
attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence
of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an
opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some
legal proceeding . . . and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed
15
and (b) not waived by the client.
Privilege may be waived by the client in some circumstances where
either the client or attorney testifies about attorney-client
communications; through voluntary disclosure or sometimes inadvertent
16
disclosure; or when the client puts the communication at issue—the
17
waiver type most pertinent to the issue at hand.
12. FED. R. EVID. 501.
13. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980) (quoting 120 Cong. Rec. 40891
(1974)).
14. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449
U.S. 383, 393 (1981)).
15. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Workman, 138 F.3d 1261, 1263 (8th Cir. 1998) (Voluntary
disclosure of attorney[-]client communications expressly waives the privilege. The waiver
covers any information directly related to that which was actually disclosed.”) (citations
omitted) See also In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[P]rivilege must be
jealously guarded by the holder of the privilege lest it be waived. The courts will grant no
greater protection to those who assert the privilege than their own precautions warrant. . . .
[T]he privilege is lost even if the disclosure is inadvertent.” (citations omitted)).
17. “The privilege which protects attorney-client communications may not be used
both as a sword and a shield. Where a party raises a claim which in fairness requires
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II. WORK PRODUCT IMMUNITY
18

A related but different right limits access to the attorney’s work
19
product prepared in anticipation of a litigation. Historically, immunity
20
existed in the federal common law until it was tacitly endorsed by
21
Hickman and finally included in the Federal Rules of Civil
22
Procedure.
In Hickman, the Supreme Court ruled that access to
opposing counsel’s work product
contravenes the public policy underlying the orderly prosecution
and defense of legal claims. Not even the most liberal of
discovery theories can justify unwarranted inquiries into the files
and the mental impressions of an attorney.
....
. . . [T]he general policy against invading the privacy of an
attorney’s course of preparation is so well recognized and so
essential to an orderly working of our system of legal procedure
that a burden rests on the one who would invade that privacy to
establish adequate reasons to justify production through a
23
subpoena or court order.
Despite this rhetoric, the Court did go on to qualify the extent of
disclosure of the protected communication, the privilege may be implicitly waived.” Chevron
Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
18. Courts even sometimes confuse the two. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 915(3)(C) Introductory Note (2000) (“The rules governing waiver
and exception applicable to work-product material generally parallel those for the attorneyclient privilege.”) See also United States v. One Tract of Real Prop. Together with All Bldgs.,
Improvements, Appurtenances, and Fixtures, 95 F.3d 422, 427-28 (6th Cir. 1996) (referring to
the “attorney work product privilege”); Thomas E. Spahn, Ten Differences Between the Work
Product Doctrine and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 46 VA. LAW. 45 (Oct. 1997). But see
Praxair, Inc. v. Atmi, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 473, 480 n. 9 (D. Del. 2006) (“Attorney-client
privilege and work product are two concepts that are treated quite differently and, in the eyes
of the law, are independent legal concepts. It does not follow that a waiver of one necessarily
means, or ought to mean, a waiver of the other" (citation omitted).
19. Work product includes the following: “(1) evidence and other facts collected by
the lawyer and her agents; (2) research collected and memoranda prepared by the lawyer;
and (3) thoughts, opinions, and mental impressions formed by the lawyer (and typically
committed to writing) about the case or the participants in the litigation.” Fred C. Zacharias,
Who Owns Work Product?, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 127, 130 (2006). Note that the work product
need not have been prepared for that particular litigation where the immunity is being
asserted. See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 967 (3d Cir. 1997).
20. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER, 19
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE JURISDICTION § 4514 (2d ed. 2007) (discussing what is
federal common law). Note, however, that the concept is beyond the scope of this Comment.
21. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509-11 (1947).
22. FED. R. CIV. PROC. 26(b)(3).
23. Hickman, 429 U.S. at 510-12.
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work product immunity: “We do not mean to say that all written
materials obtained or prepared by an adversary’s counsel with an eye
24
toward litigation are necessarily free from discovery in all cases.”
Subsequent courts have extended work product immunity beyond
25
the simple meaning of Hickman and Rule 26(b)(3) to a privilege-like
immunity for oral statements of the attorney that might embody that
26
attorney’s work product or mental impressions.
Work product can also be divided into two distinct categories:
27
factual and opinion. Factual work product can only be divulged “upon
a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the
materials . . . and that the party is unable without undue hardship to
28
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.” In
contrast, opinion work product is subject to more stringent limitations
29
on disclosure. Some courts have even interpreted Rule 26(b)(3) to
30
provide absolute protection to this element of work product.
The
24. Id. at 511.
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
Trial Preparation: Materials.
(A) Documents and Tangible Things. Ordinarily, a party may not discover
documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for
trial by or for another party or its representative (including the other party's
attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent). But, subject to Rule
26(b)(4), those materials may be discovered if:
(i) they are otherwise discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1); and
(ii) the party shows that it has substantial need for the materials to prepare its
case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by
other means.
(B) Protection Against Disclosure. If the court orders discovery of those
materials, it must protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories of a party's attorney or other representative concerning
the litigation.
Id.
26. In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 662 (3d Cir. 2003) (“It is clear from
Hickman that work product protection extends to both tangible and intangible work
product.”); United States v. One Tract of Real Prop. Together with all Bldgs, Improvements,
Appurtenances, and Fixtures, 95 F.3d 422, 428 n.10 (6th Cir. 1996) (“When applying the work
product privilege to . . . nontangible information, the principles enunciated in Hickman apply,
as opposed to Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which applies only to
‘documents and tangible things.’”) (citations omitted).
27. Factual work product can include factual case summaries, chronological
assessments, memos, or interview reports (SEC category I information).
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
29. Opinion work product typically includes documents relating to a counsel’s mental
impressions.
30. See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 732
(4th Cir. 1974) (“[O]pinion work product material, as distinguished from material not
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Supreme Court in Upjohn, while not deciding what showing is necessary
for the divulgence of opinion work product, implied that there could still
31
be specific instances where even this immunity would not stand.
Subsequently, some federal courts have, in some instances, waived
32
opinion work product immunity: Under current Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure work product can be produced if
the party shows that it has substantial need for the materials to
prepare its case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their
substantial equivalent by other means.
. . . If the court orders discovery of those materials, it must
protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories of a party’s attorney or other
33
representative concerning the litigation.
Confusingly, the theory underpinning the work product doctrine is
distinct from the rationale supporting its waiver. Simplistically, work
product immunity is designed to allocate information between
34
adversarial parties in litigation, outlining the bounds of what
35
It is
information ought to be shared between two parties in suit.
essentially an evidentiary issue. In contrast to the immunity itself,
waiver hinges on issues relating to attorney professional responsibility
to the client. This confusing nature of the work product doctrine has fed
the debate over who owns the waiver right. The American Law
36
Institute implies that the ultimate decision is that of the client.
containing mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories, is immune from
discovery.”).
31. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 400-02 (1981).
32. See, e.g., G. Michael Halfenger, Comment, The Attorney Misconduct Exception to
the Work Product Doctrine, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1082-86 (1991).
33. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
34. See In re ANR Advance Transp. Co., 302 B.R. 607, 615-17 (E.D. Wis. 2003)
(providing a more thorough discussion on the nature of the doctrine).
35. In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 1988).
While the attorney-client privilege is intended to promote communication between
attorney and client by protecting client confidences, the work-product privilege is a
broader protection, designed to balance the needs of the adversary system:
promotion of an attorney's preparation in representing a client versus society’s
general interest in revealing all true and material facts to the resolution of a dispute.
Id.
36. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 90 cmt. c
(2000).
So long as doing so is not inconsistent with the interests of the client, a lawyer may
invoke immunity on the basis of the lawyer’s independent interest in privacy. When
lawyer and client have conflicting wishes or interests with respect to work-product
material, the lawyer must follow instruction of the client.
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Professor Zacharias asserts that many jurisdictions consider waiver to
37
be owned by the attorney.
While the issue of work product immunity has also come under fire
38
as a result of the EchoStar ruling, a fuller examination is beyond the
scope of this relatively short discussion.
III. WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT OF A PATENT

39

In addition to injunctions and compensatory damages, courts have
the opportunity to attach damage multipliers, punitive damages, and
40
lawyers’ fees to patent infringement penalties; currently, the most
41
common reason for increased damages is willful infringement.
Although the term “willful” is widely used without any consistency
in statutes and case law, “it is generally understood to refer to conduct
42
that is not merely negligent.”
Willful infringement represents the
notion “that patent infringement, like other civil wrongs, is disfavored,
43
and intentional disregard of legal rights warrants deterrence.” Note
that even the Federal Circuit admits to the lack of a good definition of
44
willfulness:
Willfulness . . . is not an all-or-nothing trait, but one of
degree. . . . [It] may range from unknowing, or accidental, to
deliberate, or reckless, disregard of a patentee’s legal rights. The
role of a finding of ”willfulness” in the law of infringement is
partly as a deterrent—an economic deterrent to the tort of
Id.
37. Zacharias, supra note 19, at 135.
38. See, e.g., TiVo, Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 127 S. Ct. 846 (2006) (denying
certiorari).
39. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
[T]he Supreme Court has observed that the word willful is widely used in the law,
and, although it has not by any means been given a perfectly consistent
interpretation, it is generally understood to refer to conduct that is not merely
negligent . . . . The concept of willful infringement is not simply a conduit for
enhancement of damages; it is a statement that patent infringement, like other civil
wrongs, is disfavored, and intentional disregard of legal rights warrants deterrence.
Id.
40. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
41. 7 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.03(1)(b)(v) (2002).
42. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342.
43. Id.
44. “There are no hard and fast rules regarding a finding of willfulness.” Graco, Inc. v.
Binks Mfg. Co., 60 F.3d 785, 792 (Fed. Cir. 1995). But see, e.g., Bott v. Four Star Corp., 807
F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (establishing a three-factor test for willfulness).
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infringement—and partly as a basis for making economically
whole one who has been wronged . . . .
. . . [It] reflects a threshold of culpability in the act of
infringement that, alone or with other considerations of the
particular case, contributes to the court’s assessment of the
45
consequences of patent infringement.
Central to this idea is that willfulness is a determination of the
46
defendant’s state of mind. A factual finding of willful infringement
47
must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Once a court
48
has found a willful infringement, there is the potential for, although
49
not a guaranteed finding of, increased damages.
With the perpetual threat of increased damages, and the difficulty in
50
getting willfulness reversed on appeal, potential infringers principally
defend themselves through showing that they acted on advice of
51
counsel, a technique that often works, even when that opinion is later
45. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1125-26 (Fed. Cir. 1987). See also
Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
The issue of willful infringement measures the infringing behavior, in the
circumstances in which the infringer acted, against an objective standard of
reasonable commercial behavior in the same circumstances. . . . [It is] a measure of
reasonable commercial behavior in the context of the tort of patent infringement
[including] [t]he extent to which the infringer disregarded the property rights of the
patentee, the deliberateness of the tortious acts, . . . [and] other manifestations of
unethical or injurious commercial conduct . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
46. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 828 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
47. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(“Willfulness is a question of fact to be proven by clear and convincing evidence . . . because
the boundary between unintentional and culpable acts is not always bright”) (citations
omitted)).
48. Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 826.
An award of enhanced damages . . . is committed to the discretion of the trial court.
While no statutory standard dictates the circumstances under which the district
court may exercise its discretion, this court has approved such awards where the
infringer acted in wanton disregard of the patentee’s patent rights, that is, where the
infringement is willful.
Id.
49. “[F]inding of willful infringement merely authorizes, but does not mandate, an
award of increased damages.” Modine Mfg. Co. v. Allen Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 543 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (first emphasis added).
50. See, e.g., Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr Stahlecker & Grill GmbH v. Schubert &
Salzer Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 829 F.2d 1075, 1083 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (noting that
a “district court's finding of willful infringement is a finding of fact, reviewable under the
clearly erroneous standard”) (emphasis added).
51. See Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90
(Fed. Cir. 1983). If the defendant “has actual notice of another's patent rights, he has an
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found to be wrong.
The specter of a willful infringement decision against the defendant
in a patent infringement suit creates not only a reality where most
53
clients are advised by their attorneys to not read patents, which
undermines a principle component of the patent system and impedes
54
information and the dissemination of knowledge, but it also creates a
55
Hobson’s choice for the potential infringer. She can choose to rely on
affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether or not he is infringing.” Id. at
1389. Underwater also provides a list of criteria necessary to evaluate the sufficiency of an
advice of counsel letter. Id. at 1390. In particular, Underwater focuses at looking to the four
corners of the opinion letter. Id. Note, however, that failure to receive advice of counsel
does not create an “adverse inference that an opinion of counsel was or would have been
unfavorable.” Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Knorr-Bremse overturned a nearly twenty-year-old decision
wherein a defendant’s “silence on the subject, in alleged reliance on the attorney-client
privilege, would warrant the conclusion that it either obtained no advice of counsel or did so
and was advised that its importation and sale of the accused products would be an
infringement of valid U.S. patents.” Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565,
1580 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Note additionally that advice of counsel is not always an adequate
defense to willful infringement. The courts often recognize that counsel's opinion on validity
is evidence to be weighed towards a determination of good faith; it is not dispositive. Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Sciaky Bros., 415 F.2d 1068, 1073 (6th Cir. 1969). It is necessary to look at “the
totality of the circumstances presented in [the] case.” Underwater, 717 F.2d at 1390.
52. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H. v. Dart Indus., Inc., 862 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir.
1988). The attorney’s opinion,
although later shown to be incorrect, contained significant, scientifically based
objective factors to justify Valles’ conclusion of no infringement. He contrasted
Valles’ opinion to those in other cases which lacked any appearance of competence,
authoritativeness, or internal indicia of credibility, which, he recognized, are some of
the important factors to consider when evaluating an opinion letter.
Id. at 1579. But see Cent. Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (finding that “the attorney’s advice, based solely on file history prior art, does not by
itself raise an inference of good faith substantial enough to convince us that the trial court’s
determination of willful infringement was clearly erroneous”) (second emphasis added).
53. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness
Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1102 (2003) (discovering that “experienced patent
lawyers often advise their clients to avoid reading patents in order to avoid liability for
willfulness”).
54. “This undermines one of the principal purposes of the patent system—to make
others aware of innovations that could help stimulate further innovation.” BD. ON SCI.,
TECH., AND ECON. POLICY & GLOBAL AFFAIRS NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON
INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECON., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin, and Mark B. Myers, Eds.,
National Academies Press) (2004) [hereinafter NAS Report]. The NAS Report also notes
that the issue of willfulness is asserted in most cases and often overshadows much of the
litigation. Id. at 184.
55. Note also that a lawyer’s advice regarding this choice also becomes a Hobson’s
choice:
Any lawyer advising a client about the practical realities arising from the Fromson
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her opinion counsel’s advice as a defense but risk waiving all related
56
attorney-client privilege, or she can choose to forego the defense in
57
defending a charge of willful infringement. Even more disconcerting is
the continuing uncertainty regarding the extent of the waiver because it
may waive even trial counsels’ privileges and immunities related to the
58
issue of willful infringement.
doctrine, [the first Hobson choice], also faces a Hobson’s choice. Rule 2.1 of the
ABA Model Rules . . . requires a lawyer to advise the client candidly as to all risks
and strategies in a case. By giving candid advice, however, a lawyer places the client
at risk if the opinion either must be disclosed subsequently or an adverse inference
drawn from refusing to disclose the opinion. The lawyer’s only alternative is to
produce a sanitized opinion in the nature of a brief with the expectation that it will
be disclosed.
Under Fromson, the lawyer’s opinion becomes part and parcel of the client's
defense at trial. The sanitized opinion comes at the cost of candor. A rule that
punishes non-disclosure not only undermines the privilege but may well tarnish the
advice given.
Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at *5-6,
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 344 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (No. 01-1357), 2003 WL 23200567, available at http://www.abanet.org/intelprop/amicus_
brief.doc (last visited December 20, 2006). Ad hoc exceptions to the privilege may also cause
“general erosion.” Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 410 (1998). Thus,
Fromson penalizes candor and changes what should be candid advice into advocacy.
56. “A survey of patent case law has convinced this court that the use of the advice of
counsel defense waives the attorney-client privilege.” Mushroom Assocs. v. Monterey
Mushrooms, Inc., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1767, 1770 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
57. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 676 F. Supp. 831, 832-33
(N.D. Ill. 1987), opining that
in patent cases, the waiver rule creates a cruel dilemma for one accused of willful
infringement. While reliance on advice of counsel is not necessary per se to defend
the suit, it is, as a practical matter, absolutely essential to the good faith defense.
Thus the choice is between a complete sacrifice of the privilege or a complete
sacrifice of the defense.
Id. (emphasis added).
58. Mushroom Assocs., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1770.
Some courts have found that the invocation of the advice of counsel defense waives
both the attorney-client privilege and work product immunity. Certainly, principles
of fairness as enunciated with respect to the attorney-client privilege seem just as
applicable to the work product immunity. If a party is going to attack another
party's reliance on advice of counsel, information covered by the work product
immunity would aid in that attack.
Id. (citation omitted). In some instances this may even go to mental impressions of the
attorney. Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 931 (N.D. Cal. 1976). The
court found
that in the particular circumstances of [that] case, [the] plaintiff ha[d] made a
sufficient showing of substantial need and undue hardship to overcome the qualified
immunity from discovery for non-mental impression work product . . . . [and that
there was not] an absolute immunity from discovery for opinion work product,
barring disclosure of such material under any circumstances
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IV. UNCERTAINTY IN THE EXTENT OF WAIVER
Especially troubling for alleged infringers mounting a defense
against a willful infringement claim prior to the recent Seagate decision
has been the uncertainty regarding the extent of their waiver once they
59
produce the opinion letter. This pervasive problem may have resulted
from courts inconsistently applying vague or unrelated precedent to a
60
very fact-specific question.
Thus, Courts differ with regard to (1)
61
whose law to apply; (2) whether work product immunity is always
62
waived along with privilege; (3) whether it makes a difference if the
63
opinion work product is oral or written; (4) whether an attorney’s
Id. See also Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., No. 98C7598, 1999 WL 89570, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 12, 1999) (“The assertion of an advice of counsel defense results in a waiver of the
attorney-client privilege. Courts have held that the advice of counsel defense results in a
waiver of the attorney work product protection as well.”) (citations omitted).
59. “[T]here is considerable division of opinion about how far (if at all) the waiver
extends to work product that counsel generated before the suit was filed but did not share
with the defendant.” Sharper Image Corp. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 621, 624 n.4
(N.D. Cal. 2004). “‘An uncertain privilege—or one which purports to be certain, but rests in
widely varying applications by the courts—is little better than no privilege.’” Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 863 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting In re von Bulow, 828
F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 1987)).
60. Courts have applied the precedents to achieve any number of desired results.
While all the options have been available as judicial precedents, “the trick is to look over the
heads in the crowds and pick out your friends.” ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION 36 (Princeton University Press 1997) (quoting J. Harold Leventhal).
61. See Steelcase, Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1195, 1197-98 (W.D. Mich. 1997)
(finding that for this issue, Federal Circuit law controls). But see Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v.
E'Lite Optik, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1092 (D. Nev. 2003) (deciding that the regional
circuit law controls). Although note that
there is no such thing as the ”law of the district.” Even where the facts of a prior
district court case are, for all practical purposes, the same as those presented to a
different district court in the same district, the prior “resolution of those claims does
not bar reconsideration by this Court of similar contentions. The doctrine of stare
decisis does not compel one district court judge to follow the decision of another.”
Threadgill v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 928 F.2d 1366, 1371 (3d Cir. 1991) (citations
omitted).
62. Compare Chimie v. PPG Indus., Inc., 218 F.R.D. 416, 421 (D. Del. 2003) (refusing
to adopt the idea that a “waiver of the attorney client privilege is ipso facto a decision to
waive the protections of the work product doctrine”), with Greene, Tweed of Del., Inc. v.
DuPont Dow Elastomers, L.L.C., 202 F.R.D. 418, 420 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (“The waiver principle
applies to work product immunity as well as to the attorney-client privilege. Therefore, where
a party asserts the advice of counsel as an essential element of its defense, work product
immunity, like attorney-client privilege, is waived with respect to the subject of that advice.”)
(citation omitted).
63. See, e.g., Variable-Parameter Fixture Dev. Corp. v. Morpheus Lights, Inc., 31
U.S.P.Q.2d 1158, 1160 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (distinguishing precedence, noting that the Plaintiff
“has demonstrated a substantial need for . . . [counsel’s documents], given that the opinion
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64

opinion work product immunity is also waived; (5) whether immunity
regarding information not provided to the client is included in the
65
66
waiver; (6) the extent of the waiver in terms of subject matter; (7) the
provided by the Rosenblum firm was given orally. Thus, access to all documents before the
opinion provider is essential to cross-examination.”).
64. See, e.g., Holmgren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 573, 577 (9th Cir.
1992) (finding that opinion work product is discoverable where the “mental impressions [of
counsel] are at issue and the need for the material is compelling”) (emphasis omitted).
65. See Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 486-87 (3d Cir. 1995)
(compelling a law firm to provide the entire file relating to the opinion letter including
documents that were never provided to the defendant). See also Mosel Vitelic Corp. v.
Micron Tech., Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 307, 312 (D. Del. 2000).
[B]y limiting the waiver of the privilege only to those matters which are
communicated to the client, Thorn and its progeny have effectively encouraged
patent counsel to place only the most favorable version of the facts and the law in
their opinion letters, even if these attorneys are aware of other information which is
far less helpful to their client.
Id. Contra Thorn EMI N. Am., Inc., v. Micron Tech., Inc., 837 F. Supp. 616, 622 (D. Del.
1993) (“[T]he determination of a claim of willful infringement relate[s] to the infringer’s state
of mind. Counsel’s mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories are not
probative of that state of mind unless they have been communicated to that client.”).
66. See Mushroom Assocs. v. Monterey Mushrooms, Inc., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1767, 1770
(N.D. Cal. 1992) (finding that the defendants waived the attorney-client privilege with respect
to all documents that pertained to the infringement of the patent); Steelcase, 954 F. Supp. at
1198-99 (requiring that the opinion be produced without redaction, even irrelevant
information, and including all documents that refer or relate, or documents that could be the
basis for the opinion letter); Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Eon Labs. Mfg., 206 F.R.D. 396, 399
(D. Del. 2002). The court found
it is critical for the patentee to have a full opportunity to probe, not only the state of
mind of the infringer, but also the mind of the infringer's lawyer upon which the
infringer so firmly relied. There is no reason why the alleged infringer's waiver of
the attorney-client privilege should not be considered absolute, encompassing
materials typically protected by the work product doctrine.
....
. . . [And ruling that] because Eon has relied on the advice of counsel defense, the
Court concludes that Eon has waived any privilege that may pertain to those
documents and communications related in any way to its counsel's opinion.
Id. Contra Kelsey-Hayes Co. v. Motor Wheel Corp., 155 F.R.D. 170, 172 (W.D. Mich. 1991)
(“[I]n patent cases, courts generally construe the scope of the subject matter waiver
narrowly.”); Thorn, 837 F. Supp. at 622 (“The facts of consequence to the determination of a
claim of willful infringement relate to the infringer's state of mind. Counsel's mental
impression, conclusions, opinions or legal theories are not probative of that state of mind
unless they have been communicated to that client”); Dunhall Pharms., Inc. v. Discus Dental,
Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1202, 1210 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (rejecting “the contention that by asserting an
advice of counsel defense to willful infringement, the Defendants were required to waive
attorney client privilege and work product protections on each subject matter addressed in
the opinion letters, i.e., infringement, validity and enforceability.”); Nitinol Med. Techs., Inc.
v. AGA Med. Corp., 135 F. Supp. 2d 212, 217 (D. Mass. 2000) (“The issue of infringement is
distinct from the issues of validity and enforceability . . . . [W]aiver of the attorney-client
privilege as to one issue does [not] serve as a waiver of the privilege as to all issues.”)
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temporal extent of the waiver—i.e., at what time point is subsequent
attorney client discussion and work product no longer part of the
67
waived component; and, most important for this discussion, (8)
whether waiver by one counsel will affect other counsel’s (most
68
distressingly trial counsel’s) privileges and immunities. Without any
consensus among the courts as to the extent of waiver, lawyers and their
clients cannot accurately calculate the costs and benefits of an advice of
counsel defense. EchoStar was a failed effort by the Federal Circuit to
clear up this issue and the direct impetus for the Seagate decision.

(alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
67. See, e.g., Dunhall, 994 F. Supp. at 1206 (finding that waiver applies only to
documents produced “up to the time that the lawsuit was filed”). While likely related to the
subject matter of the asserted defense, information produced for trial is fundamentally
different from a similar pre-litigation analysis. In comparison to work product produced
prior to the filing of the lawsuit, litigation-related work product deserves greater protection.
Id. See also Motorola, Inc. v. Vosi Techs., Inc., No. 01C4182, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15655, at
*7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2002) (limiting waiver to advice defendant received before suit was
filed); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 659, 664 (S.D. Ind.
2001) (ruling that waiver does not extend past the start of trial); Hoover Universal, Inc. v.
Graham Packaging Corp., 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1596, 1598 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (finding that waiver is
“limited to documents created prior to May 17, 1995, the date the first complaint was filed”).
Contra Akeva L.L.C. v. Mizuno Corp., 243 F. Supp. 2d 418, 423 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (“[T]he
waiver of attorney-client privilege or work product protection covers all points of time,
including up through trial.”); Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1188 n.4
(E.D. Cal. 2001) (“[T]emporal scope of the work product waiver necessarily [does not end]
with the filing of the litigation.”); Thermos Co. v. Starbucks Corp., No. 96C3833, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17753, *13 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 1998) (“[T]he waiver does not cease as of the date
an opinion letter is authored.”); McCormick-Morgan, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus. Inc., 21
U.S.P.Q.2d 1412, 1424 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (“[I]t is not appropriate . . . for the waiving parties or
judge to limit the waiver on a temporal basis.”); Smith v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 538 F.
Supp. 977, 980-82 (D. Del. 1982), aff'd, 758 F.2d 668 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding that a waiver of
privilege on counsel's also applied to later communications on the same subject).
68. Compare Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1191 (D.S.C.
1974) (limiting waiver to “all communications between the same attorney and the same client
on the same subject made before the privileged document was voluntarily waived”); Chiron,
179 F. Supp. 2d at 1188 n.5 (“The court does not hold that litigation counsel opinion would
necessarily be immune from discovery.”); Micron Separations, 159 F.R.D. at 365 (waiver
extends to work product of trial counsel expressed to defendant which contain “potentially
damaging information” and/or express “grave reservations” respecting the opinion letter)
(emphasis in original), with Beneficial Franchise Co. v. Bank One, 205 F.R.D. 212, 218 (N.D.
Ill. 2001) (“[F]airness is served by allowing the opposing party to have access to documents
casting doubt or contradicting those opinions—even if prepared by trial counsel after suit was
commenced.”); Thermos Co., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17753 at *13 (ordering “[d]efendants to
produce only those documents authored by their present trial counsel which (1) counsel
communicated to Defendants and (2) contain conclusions that contradict or cast doubt” on
the opinion letters).
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V. ECHOSTAR
Prior to EchoStar, the Federal Circuit, in an en banc decision, ruled
that no adverse assumption could be made regarding a defendant’s
decision to not claim an advice of counsel defense against a charge of
69
Nevertheless defendants continue to use the
willful infringement.
defense of advice of counsel even considering the uncertain
70
consequences.
EchoStar was sued by TiVo for patent infringement on patent
71
number 6,233,389—“a multimedia time warping system.” Prior to the
filing of the suit, EchoStar looked to in-house counsel for an opinion as
to the potential infringement on TiVo’s patents. Subsequent to the suit,
EchoStar sought, but initially ignored, further advice from outside
counsel, Merchant & Gould. The district court ruled that in relying on
its in-house counsel for a defense against willful infringement, EchoStar
waived both attorney-client privilege and work product immunity, with
regard to both in-house counsel and Merchant & Gould, and that the
scope of the waiver included communications made either before
or after the filing of the complaint and any work product,
whether or not the product was communicated to EchoStar. . . .
....
. . . [As the] documents could be relevant or lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence because they might contain information
that was conveyed to EchoStar, even if the documents were not
72
themselves conveyed.
Seeing an opportunity to set the record straight on waiver, the
Federal Circuit allowed an appeal. Citing Advanced Cardiovascular
73
Systems v. Medtronic, Inc., the court first made it clear that given the
patent focus of the inquiry, the decision would be based not on regional
74
circuit law, but on Federal Circuit law.
75
Next, citing Akeva, the Federal Circuit noted that there was no
69. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The adverse inference that an opinion was or would have been
unfavorable, flowing from the infringer's failure to obtain or produce an exculpatory opinion
of counsel, is no longer warranted. Precedent authorizing such inference is overruled.”)
70. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Empirical Statistics on Willful Patent Infringement, 14
FED. CIR. B.J. 227, 228 (2004).
71. Patent 6,233,389 (filed July 30, 1998).
72. In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
73. 265 F.3d 1294, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
74. EchoStar, 448 F.3d at 1298.
75. Akeva L.L.C. v. Mizuno Corp., 243 F. Supp. 2d 418, 423 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
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distinction with regard to the matter at hand between in-house counsel
and counsel sought from Merchant & Gould—communication between
76
both was waived.
In determining the scope of the privilege waiver, the court
77
acknowledged the fears raised by the plaintiff in XYZ Corporation:
the use of privilege as both “a sword and a shield” disclosing only
favorable communication but withholding unfavorable communication.
To prevent such an abuse, the court ruled that waiver includes “all such
78
communications regarding the same subject matter.”
Next, in ruling on work product immunity waiver, the court noted
the blurred distinction between factual and opinion work product and
asserted that the district court should “balance the policies to prevent
sword-and-shield litigation tactics with the policy to protect work
79
product.”
The court also enumerated a non-exhaustive list of three potentially
relevant categories of work product:
(1) documents that embody a communication between the
attorney and client concerning the subject matter of the case,
such as a traditional opinion letter; (2) documents analyzing the
law, facts, trial strategy, and so forth that reflect the attorney’s
mental impressions but were not given to the client; and (3)
documents that discuss a communication between attorney and
client concerning the subject matter of the case but are not
80
themselves communications to or from the client.
As to the first category, the court found that generally all courts
81
agreed, but that there was dissention within the district courts as to the
82
next two categories of work product. To repair the inconsistencies, the
court decided definitively that waiver would include the third category
but not the second, which may include some of the disputed Merchant
& Gould documents, noting that
[w]ork-product waiver extends only so far as to inform the court
of the infringer’s state of mind. Counsel’s opinion is not
important for its legal correctness. It is important to the inquiry
“whether it is thorough enough, as combined with other factors,
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

EchoStar, 448 F.3d at 1304-05.
XYZ Corp. v. United States, 348 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir. 2003).
EchoStar, 448 F.3d at 1301.
Id. at 1302.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 1302-03.
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to instill a belief in the infringer that a court might reasonably
83
hold the patent is invalid, not infringed, or unenforceable.”
The court also resolved the temporal issue with regard to waiver,
once again quoting Akeva: “once a party asserts the defense of advice of
counsel, this opens to inspection the advice received during the entire
course of the alleged infringement,” including privileged information
84
relayed during trial.
Although EchoStar never mentioned the issue of waiver of trial
counsel’s privilege and immunity, it mentions, albeit in dicta and in a
85
footnote, Akeva, in a favorable light. The citation points to a very
broad interpretation of waiver:
[B]ecause infringement is a continuing activity, the requirement
to exercise due care and seek and receive advice is a continuing
duty. Therefore, once a party asserts the defense of advice of
counsel, this opens to inspection the advice received during the
entire course of the alleged infringement. Consequently, the
waiver of attorney-client privilege or work product protection
covers all points of time, including up through trial. The waiver
also is not limited to the advice given by opinion counsel. Since
the waiver encompasses the subject matter of advice, that means
that all opinions received by the client must be revealed, even
those opinions the client receives from attorneys other than opinion
86
counsel.
This favorable mention has led to some confusion regarding the
exact nature of the EchoStar opinion, particularly as to whether waiver
87
extends even to trial counsel.
83. Id. at 1303 (emphasis in the original).
84. Id. at 1302 n.4 (quoting Akeva L.L.C. v. Mizuno Corp., 243 F. Supp. 2d 418, 423
(M.D.N.C. 2003)).
85. Id. In summarizing his comments in Akeva, Judge Eliason cabins the opinion
somewhat, noting that
the broad waiver rule requiring full disclosure of documents, even if they were not
given to the client, is best suited to the situation where the opinion counsel is [also]
trial counsel . . . . [where] there is a greater need to make sure the opinion is not
tainted by bias or other influences. And, counsel’s uncommunicated thoughts and
information may also be relevant in determining the competency of the opinion. . . .
To the extent that a broader waiver of work product protection might also disclose
the trial attorney has been orchestrating a sham opinion with opinion counsel, the
Court finds that possibility to be sufficiently remote and more difficult to
orchestrate. Therefore, when the opinion counsel is independent, and should
nothing else appear, the broader waiver of work product need not be employed.
Akeva, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 424.
86. Id. at 423 (emphasis added).
87. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Simple.com, Inc., No. O2 CIV. 2748, 2006 U.S. Dist.
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EchoStar not only failed in its attempt to resolve the issue, but it and
88
its progeny have further added to the confusion. Unfortunately, while
a full examination of the twenty-odd subsequent cases is beyond the
limitations of this Comment, it is worth noting that in EchoStar there
are inconsistencies with regard to subject matter scope, temporal scope,
and, most relevant to this discussion, the inclusion of trial counsel within
89
the waiver. Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit has refused to rehear the
LEXIS 77077, at **12-13 (E.D.N.Y. October 20, 2006). Note, however, that the discussion in
Akeva, referenced by many cases, discusses only privilege and not work product immunity.
88. “[P]redictably, the courts that have reviewed this issue post-EchoStar are split.”
CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Mitchell Int’l, Inc., No. 03C2695, 2006 WL 3486810, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 1, 2006).
89. See, e.g., Computer Assocs., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77077, at *13. The court noted
that although EchoStar did not involve issues relating to waiver of trial counsel immunity and
privilege, EchoStar cites favorably to Akeva:
The supporting citation to Akeva . . . indicates to this Court that the Federal Circuit
would extend the waiver to all attorneys who provided advice, including, in the case
of ongoing infringement, trial counsel. Excluding trial counsel from the scope of the
waiver would permit a party to use the attorney-client privilege as both a sword and
shield by allowing a party to choose which opinions are disclosed and which are not.
Id. See also Affinion Net Patents, Inc. v. Maritz, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 354, 356-57 (D. Del.
2006) (noting that its interpretation of EchoStar would include waiver of both trial counsel
and opinion counsel’s privilege with regard to willful infringement). As opposed to other
cases, the Affinion court does not need to make reference to Akeva to support this reading; it
simply states that EchoStar is to be understood as waiver of communications with all counsel
and with regard to any particular defense of infringement. See id. at 357. See also Ampex
Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 04-1373-KAJ, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48702, at **7-9 (D.
Del. July 17, 2006) (finding that EchoStar dealt primarily with issues relating to work product
immunity, that it only dealt with privilege broadly and reasserted general principles, and that
EchoStar ought to be limited only to the particular facts of the case); In re Target Tech. Co.,
Misc. Docket No. 827, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 26240, at **4-5 (Fed. Cir. October 12, 2006)
(although basing its ruling on Ninth Circuit law, the court found that even extrajudicial
disclosures relating to an opinion letter constitute a waiver); Intex Recreation Corp. v. Team
Worldwide Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 46, 50-51 (D.D.C. 2006) (extending the coverage of subject
matter to issues beyond the actual communication at issue and ruling that “Intex has waived
the attorney-client and work product privileges ‘for any document or opinion that embodies
or discusses a communication to or from it concerning whether patent ‘469 is valid,
enforceable, and infringed,’” but also finding any issue relating to the temporal nature of the
waiver to be limited to the particular facts of EchoStar and not applicable) (citations
omitted); Outside the Box Innovations, L.L.C. v. Travel Caddy, Inc. 455 F. Supp. 2d 1374,
1379 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (ruling that there was a waiver of “[a]ll documents that reflect
communications . . . that relate to the scope, validity, infringement, and/or enforceability of
the ‘992 and ‘104 patents, including any and all attorney notes, summaries, documents and
drafts of documents related to the same subject matters and that embody or discuss a
communication” and “[a]ny document or opinion that embodies or discusses a
communication . . . [regarding whether the patent is] valid, enforceable, and infringed . . .
regardless of the counsel involved, and regardless of the date”) (emphasis added); Ind. Mills
& Mfg., Inc. v. Dorel Indus., Inc., No. 1:04-CV-01102-LJM-WTL, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
34023, at *19 (S.D. Ind. May 26, 2006) (reading EchoStar to mean that the temporal scope of
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90

case en banc, thus leaving it to district-level judiciary and possibly
extra-judiciary methods to help litigants in this area of law. The Federal
Circuit’s seeming initial complacency with regard to these uncertainties
seemed to be in direct opposition to the policies stated by the Supreme
91
Court.
The Federal Circuit’s contentment with its Echostar soon
dissolved, and it quickly agreed to take up In re Seagate en banc to try
again to sort out the issues.
VI. IN RE SEAGATE
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Convolve Inc. sued
Seagate in the summer of 2000, asserting willful infringement of two
92
patents. In response, Seagate obtained, over the span of a number of
years, three written opinions from its counsel, Gerald Sekimura. Each
of the letters concluded that many of Convolve’s patent claims were
invalid, that the patents were possibly unenforceable, and that Seagate
93
did not infringe. Although the parties did not dispute the independent
nature of the opinion counsel as distinct from the trial counsel,

the waiver does not always extend post filing of the litigation and that the subject matter
waiver is limited to the subject matter of the waived opinion letter); Beck Sys., Inc. v.
Managesoft Corp., No. 05C2036, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53963, at **16-17 (N.D. Ill. July 14,
2006) (extending waiver of privilege and immunity to trial counsel, but limiting the subject
matter narrowly to the discussion in the opinion letter); Autobytel, Inc. v. Dealix Corp., 455
F. Supp. 2d 569, 575 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (noting that the court was “not persuaded that
EchoStar mandates waiver as to unenforceability, validity, and non-infringement when an
advice-of-counsel defense of non-infringement only is asserted.”); Abbott Labs. v. Andrx
Pharms., Inc., No. 05C1490, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55647, at *15 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 2006)
(reading EchoStar to not endorse an automatic waiver of work product immunity following a
waiver of attorney-client privilege); Informatica Corp. v. Bus. Objects Data Integration, Inc.,
No. C02-3378 JSW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58976, at **5-7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2006) (reading
EchoStar’s support of Akeva to infer a waiver of trial counsel privilege as well following the
disclosure of an opinion letter); Genentech, Inc. v. Insmed Corp., 442 F. Supp. 2d 838, 843
(N.D. Cal. 2006) (noting that a statement by trial counsel stating that it had not commented
on a likelihood of success regarding invalidity or infringement would not be credible, and
therefore a waiver by the defendant on an opinion letter would almost always also waive trial
counsel privilege); CCC Info. Services, 2006 WL 3486810, at **4-6 (understanding EchoStar
to limit the waiver of privilege to only the particular subject matter, including allowing for the
redaction of related text in the opinion letter).
90. Certiorari was also denied by the Supreme Court, although in that instance, TiVo
was asking the Court to narrow the Federal Circuit’s per se rule against disclosure of
undisclosed attorney mental impressions. TiVo, Inc. v. EchoStar Commc'n Corp., 127 S. Ct.
846 (2006).
91. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996).
92. This was later changed to three patents in an amended complaint in January of
2002. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
93. Id. at 1366.
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Convolve attempted to get privilege and immunity waived for trial
counsel as well: Convolve asserted that Seagate waived its attorney
client privilege through notifying of its intent to rely on the three letters
and moved for discovery of communications and work product of
94
Seagate’s trial counsel. The trial court concluded in favor of Convolve:
Seagate had waived privilege and work product immunity with any and
all counsel with regard to infringement invalidity and enforceability
opinions from the time that Seagate first learned of the patents and
95
through the course trial.
In response to Seagate’s writ of mandamus, the Federal Circuit took
up the case en banc. There was universal anticipation that the court
would thoroughly deal with the issue and finally get it right sorting out
the mess twenty-five years in the making.
In its decision, released August 20, 2007, the court overruled
Underwater Devices, and attempted to “clarify the scope of the waiver
of attorney-client privilege and work product protection that results
when an accused patent infringer asserts an advice of counsel defense to
96
a charge of willful infringement.”
97
In rejecting Underwater Devices, the court eliminated the
affirmative duty of care to determine whether one was infringing
another’s patent rights, i.e., “inter alia, the duty to seek and obtain
competent legal advice from counsel before the initiation of any possible
98
infringing activity,” and reemphasized that there is no affirmative
obligation to obtain opinion of counsel. In doing away with this duty,
the court justified its discarding of its earlier decision, noting that the
duty was created at a time when there was “widespread disregard of
patent rights [that] was undermining the national innovation
99
This fear, having now been assuaged to the court’s
incentive.”
satisfaction, allowed it to overrule a now outdated ruling.
The court also reassessed the threshold requirement for finding

94. Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Comp. Corp., 224 F.R.D. 98, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
95. Id. at 110.
96. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1365.
97. Underwater Devices’ position regarding an affirmative duty of care, and the
necessity of seeking out advice of counsel itself, was arguably not supported by the case law it
itself cited. Simon Frankel and Deanna Kwong, Willful Infringement and Privilege After In re
Seagate, Address before SFIPLA (Nov. 16, 2007).
98. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1368-69 (citation omitted).
99. Id. (citing Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383
F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (citing Advisory Committee on Industrial
Innovation Final Report, Dep't of Commerce (Sep. 1979))).
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willful infringement. Underwater Devices had created a relatively low
100
threshold similar to a negligence standard.
In Seagate, the Federal
Circuit, in finding this standard inconsistent with Supreme Court
precedent, created a new two part standard:
(i) an objective
recklessness inquiry that shifted the burden of proof of willful
infringement to the patentee. To surmount this threshold, a patentee
has to first prove by clear and convincing evidence that the putative
infringer continued her actions despite the objectively high likelihood
that her actions constituted infringement, and (ii) a subjective standard
that this risk of infringement was known, or should have been known to
101
the defendant.
While this ruling would seem to provide potential infringers with
much needed relief, it is still unclear how a jury might nevertheless see a
defendant who in the face of a potential infringement did not seek an
attorney’s opinion on infringement; or, if it did, still refused to show it to
the court.
The decision may have shifted the balance of power too
overwhelmingly in favor of defendants who might now be able to seek a
declaratory judgment, in a favorable jurisdiction, in response to the
extensive notice of infringement that is required by the Seagate decision
to set off a charge of willful infringement.
Of additional interest to litigators is the potential for the automatic
tying of the now high threshold for finding willfulness with the
determination that the case is exceptional enough to award attorney
102
If the patentee can overcome the high threshold to show an
fees.
objective and subjective willful infringement by the defendant, courts
might rightly, or wrongly, assume that attorney’s fees are also in order.
Note however that the entire discussion regarding willfulness may
soon become moot, and begs the question as to why the Federal Circuit
chose, sua sponte, to address the issue of willfulness. Current patent
legislation in Congress attempts to deal directly with the issue of
willfulness in patent litigation, and according to some consumer
advocacy groups, does a better job at cabining the definition of
103
willfulness than the Seagate court.
100. Id. at 1371.
101. Id.
102. See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006).
103. See, e.g., Press Release: Consumer Groups Ask Senate to Take Up Patent Bill
(Nov. 7, 2007), available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/1258 (suggesting that
further clarity is still required “to reduce the pressure on defendants to license patents of
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Section 5(c) of the Patent Reform Act of 2007, in describing
instances where willful infringement may not be found, notes, as the
104
first example, the reasonable reliance on advice of counsel.
This
legislation would seem to reinstate the opinion letter to its former level
of importance in determining willfulness, irrespective of the current
decision of the court. Further, the legislation, which notably was passed
subsequent to the Seagate decision, does not include a subjective
component to the willfulness test. Instead it requires only that the
alleged infringer receive
written notice from the patentee—(i) alleging acts of
infringement in a manner sufficient to give the infringer an
objectively reasonable apprehension of suit on such patent, and
(ii) identifying with particularity each claim of the patent, each
product or process that the patent owner alleges infringes the
patent, and the relationship of such product or process to such
claim, the infringer, after a reasonable opportunity to investigate,
thereafter performed one or more of the alleged acts of
105
infringement;
The proposed legislation further implies the potential necessity for a
separate trial to deal explicitly with willfulness. Note that the usage of a
separate proceeding may in and of itself limit the damage caused by the
waiver of privilege and immunity, further diminishing the court’s
106
decision.
Patent reform though does not cover all of the decisions made in
Seagate, particularly, how to decide the extent of counsel’s waiver.
In dealing with waiver of trial counsel privilege and work product
immunity, Seagate set out to definitively state that the production of an
opinion counsel’s letter in response to a charge of willful infringement
will not waive attorney client privilege for related communications with
107
trial counsel.
Further, the court found that the temporal bounds of
any waiver would extend only up and to, but not including litigation;
questionable quality.”). Note, many expect the legislation to pass this year: The Intellectual
Property Owners Association believes that the patent reform initiative “is very much alive.
Despite substantial opposition in the Senate, most observers believe Judiciary Chairman
Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) will attempt to pass the bill in the Senate this year or early next year
with substantial amendments.” Stakeholders Lobby on Patent Reform; Senate Bill Viewed as
'Alive,' but Stalled, 75 PAT., TRADEMARK, & COPYRIGHT J. 58 (Nov. 16, 2007).
104. H. Res. 1908, 110th Cong. § 5(b)(3)(B)(i) (as passed by House of
Representatives, Sept. 7, 2007).
105. Id. § 5(b)(2).
106. See id. at § 5(b)(3)(C)(4).
107. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1374.

2008] WAIVER AS A RESULT OF COUNSEL’S OPINION LETTER

177

opinions obtained after the filing of a complaint of infringement will
have limited probative value to the determination of willful
108
infringement.
The plaintiff’s high bar to proving willfulness includes
the fact that willfulness must be objectively provable prior to claiming it.
109
As such, only actions up to the filing of a claim are relevant.
In terms of work product immunity, the court, in light of its new
willfulness standard concluded
“that the significantly different functions of trial counsel and
opinion counsel advise against extending waiver to trial counsel.
Whereas opinion counsel serves to provide an objective
assessment for making informed business decisions, trial counsel
focuses on litigation strategy and evaluates the most successful
manner of presenting a case to a judicial decision maker. And
110
trial counsel is engaged in an adversarial process.”
Thus, the court emphatically stated that
the same rationale generally limiting waiver of the attorneyclient privilege with trial counsel applies with even greater force
to so limiting work product waiver because of the nature of the
work product doctrine. Protecting lawyers from broad subject
matter of work product disclosure “strengthens the adversary
process, and . . . may ultimately and ideally further the search for
the truth.” In addition, trial counsel's mental processes . . . enjoy
the utmost protection from disclosure; a scope of waiver
commensurate with the nature of such heightened protection is
111
appropriate.
Adding to its pro-defendant stance, the court, citing the Third
112
Circuit’s In re Cendant Corp., extended the work product doctrine
beyond “‘documents and tangible things’ . . . . to ‘nontangible’ work
113
product” as well.
Still, the court left open, somewhat cryptically, the possibility that
trial counsel’s work product immunity and privilege could be waived
under some circumstances: “trial courts remain free to exercise their
discretion in unique circumstances to extend waiver to trial counsel,
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1373.
111. Id. at 1375-76 (citations omitted).
112. In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 662 (3d Cir. 2003).
113. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1376. “We agree that work product protection remains
available to ‘nontangible’ work product under Hickman. Otherwise, attorneys’ files would be
protected from discovery, but attorneys themselves would have no work product objection to
depositions.” Id.
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such as if a party or counsel engages in chicanery.”
The Federal Circuit does not have any significant history in defining
chicanery, mentioning it only three other times in its entire quarter
115
century of rulings; two of those three references refer to the linguistic
chicanery of the patent prosecutor–this level of chicanery–suggestive
more of “word play” than outright deceit, does not seem to rise to the
116
chicanery typically defined as subterfuge, fraud, or misrepresentation.
With such a low bar, it seems likely that many cases will rise to the
Federal Circuit’s level of chicanery. Moreover, chicanery is only one of
the instances that will result in waiver; the court left it to trial courts to
decide what other instances will allow for the waiver of privilege and
immunity.
Of further concern is the fact that while attorney-client privilege is
for the client to waive, the court suggests that the attorney’s conduct
117
alone—i.e., chicanery—could waive this right of the client.
Of additional interest, and not addressed by the court, is the status
114. Id. at 1374-75. Note the court also states that work product immunity is not
waived, “absent exceptional circumstances.” Id. at 1375. Like chicanery, the court is not
clear as to what arises to an exceptional circumstance except with regard to deciding whether
to adhere to a decision in a prior appeal. See, e.g., Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel &
Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing precedent showing that a court generally
adheres to a decision in a prior appeal in the case unless one of three “exceptional
circumstances” exists: “the evidence on a subsequent trial was substantially different,
controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of the law applicable to such issues,
or the decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.”).
115. DeMarini Sports v. Worth, Inc., 239 F.3d 1314, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Vehicular
Techs. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int'l, Inc., 141 F.3d 1084, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Egan v. Dep't of
Navy, 802 F.2d 1563, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
116. Other areas of law may shine some light into whether courts discriminate as to the
level of chicanery: “A statement containing a half-truth may be as misleading as a statement
wholly false. Thus, a statement that contains only favorable matters and omits all reference
to unfavorable matters is as much a false representation as if all the facts stated were untrue.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 529a (2007). Contrast this relatively low threshold
for misleading the court in a tort situation with a significantly higher threshold for falsehood
with regard to perjury: “the perjury statute is not to be loosely construed, nor the statute
invoked simply because a wily witness succeeds in derailing the questioner—so long as the
witness speaks the literal truth. The burden is on the questioner to pin the witness down to
the specific object of the questioner's inquiry.” Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 360
(1973) (not finding perjury when Mr. Bronston did not answer a question: “Q. Do you have
any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr. Bronston? A. No, sir. Q. Have you ever? A. The
company had an account there for about six months, in Zürich.” It was later determined that
Mr. Bronston did have accounts in Switzerland. Id. at 354). Later courts have refused to
overrule or close up this perjury loophole.
117. The case law on inadvertent waiver may be relevant here. In Underwater Storage
the court ruled that the inadvertence of counsel would be imputed to the client. Underwater
Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D.D.C. 1970).
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and definition of in-house counsel in relation to trial or opinion
118
counsel: What if any is the scope of protection for in-house counsel’s
work product? Is in-house counsel’s investigation of infringement
sufficient to overcome a charge of willful infringement by a patentee? It
will also be interesting to see how future courts, in following the Seagate
decision deal with instances where trial counsel and opinion counsel are
the same, or work within the same firm—often necessary, either to
reduce overall attorney fees or to get a comprehensive and cohesive
understanding of the technology and the eventual litigation.
Also left unresolved is the issue of the continued use and necessity
of opinion letters. It remains unclear as to when an accused infringer
may want to obtain an opinion letter. For instance, it would probably
behoove a defendant to obtain a letter in an instance where the
infringing product closely resembles the plaintiff’s patent. In particular,
what role, if any, will an opinion letter play in the determination of
recklessness—the new objective standard.
Fortunately, none of these issues have been brought up in the
handful of cases following Seagate, although they will eventually need to
be dealt with.
Seagate’s solution is too broad: it wholly eliminates any affirmative
duty of care on the part of the putative infringer. Here, the Federal
Circuit lost its chance to adjust or modulate the burden—allowing it to
be easily reinstated when necessary—and instead has chosen to dismiss
it entirely. Nonetheless, without this affirmative duty there is arguably
little need to get an opinion letter, and without an opinion letter there is
no fear that an over-zealous court will ravage trial counsel’s privileges
and immunities.
But, in contradistinction to this position, it would seem that an
affirmative duty is all the more relevant today. With the concept of
mutually assured destruction—i.e. building up enormous patent
portfolios with the understanding that a patentee plaintiff would be
crazy to assert her patent because the defendant could easily turn
around and assert his own patent portfolio—driving much of hi-tech and
119
biotech patenting strategies,
determining whether one actually
infringes a patent in a competitor (or non-competitor’s) portfolio is non-

118. Seagate 497 F.3d at 1366 n.2 (“We do not address the trial court's discovery orders
pertaining to Seagate's in-house counsel.”).
119. Chris Oakes, Patently Absurd, WIRED (Ma. 3, 2000). See also Lee Hudson
Teslik, Patching up the Patent System (Mar. 26, 2007), available at http://www.cfr.org/
publication/12948/patching_up_the_patent_system.html.
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trivial and potentially a prohibitive one for small start-ups. Until
Seagate the potential threat of willful infringement—particularly for a
startup—may have been enough incentive to design around the
threatening patent, thereby innovating and further benefiting society.
But now, without an affirmative duty to determine whether one is
infringing, there is a perverse incentive to return to the pre-Federal
Circuit days and begin ignoring patents anew. Moreover, with the new
heightened standard of willful infringement, a concomitant lesser
chance of paying treble damages and attorney’s fees, there is a further
disincentive to avoid infringing patents, even for the larger companies.
It would seem unlikely that the patent system can thrive without
some sort of affirmative duty here. Given that the court could have
adjusted the duty instead of throwing it out, its actions again seem rash
and irresponsible.
Notwithstanding this ruling, trial courts will most likely find some
backdoor duty. And opinion letters, because of an actual or threatened
resurfacing of affirmative duty, will come back into vogue and new
waiver issues will arise—particularly with regard to in-house counsel.
Seagate actually comes off as an ill-timed scramble to rectify too
many self-created problems with seemingly simplistic solutions.
120
Willfulness was being dealt with by legislation —now there may be
competing rules for dealing with this subject. Moreover, given the new
standards devised by the courts, patentees will have to send out
relatively expansive cease and desist letters that will allow an infringer
the opportunity to seek out a declaratory judgment in a favorable
jurisdiction—creating a strong disincentive to send out such letters in
the first place and resulting in lesser incentives on the patent infringer to
innovate and design around the infringed patent, leading to a
discrediting of the patent system and right back where the Federal
121
Circuit started twenty-five years ago with Underwater Devices.
Further, this decision would suggest that patent holders would do
well to seek out preliminary injunctions against infringers to maintain
122
their ability to claim willful infringement.
Unfortunately for the
120. See supra text accompanying notes 103-106.
121. This concern is further enhanced by the following recent ruling: SanDisk Corp. v.
STMicroelectronics, Inc. 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Note that this decision is also an
example of the Federal Circuit swinging too broadly, this time in response to a Supreme
Court footnote from MedImmune v. Genentech,127 S. Ct. 764 (2007).
122. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1374 (citation omitted). The court stated that a
patentee can move for a preliminary injunction, which generally provides an
adequate remedy for combating post-filing willful infringement. A patentee who
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patent holder, post eBay, it may be more difficult to obtain such an
123
injunction.
Succinctly Seagate hasn’t accomplished much. Throwing out the
longstanding affirmative duty of care could lead to a devaluation of
patents and too big a shift by the Federal Circuit in favor of
124
Opinion letters, it seems, may continue to be important
defendants.
and valued, at least by juries, and the waiver issue remains open, not
only in instances of chicanery and exceptional circumstances, but with
regard to in-house counsel, and firms that serve as both opinion and
125
trial counsel.
Perhaps these seemingly irrational actions by the Federal Circuit can
126
be better understood through the lens of public choice theory.
Public choice theory, an economic theory developed by Nobel
Prize laureate James Buchanan, looks to economic principles that
dictate an individual’s actions in the market, such as utility and selfinterest. These principles are then applied to larger government groups
replacing “romantic and illusory . . . notions about the workings of
127
governments [with] . . . notions that embody more skepticism." Thus,
with voters often choosing to ignore most issues, politicians are free to

does not attempt to stop an accused infringer's activities in this manner should not
be allowed to accrue enhanced damages based solely on the infringer's post-filing
conduct. Similarly, if a patentee attempts to secure injunctive relief but fails, it is
likely the infringement did not rise to the level of recklessness.
Id.
123 Ebay, Inc. v. Mercexchange, LLC, 126 S.Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006). Although eBay
dealt with permanent injunctions which requires the determination of actual success in
litigation versus a reasonable likelihood of success for a preliminary injunction, both
preliminary and permanent injunctions are based on the same statutory authority emanating
from 35 U.S.C. § 283. See New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
80443, at **345-47 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)
124. Note however that this may balance out in some jurisdictions where there is an
obvious bias in favor of the patentee, such as the International Trade Commission or
Marshall Texas. See Robert W. Hahn, Assessing Bias in Patent Infringement Cases: A Review
of International Trade Commission Decisions 15 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center For Reg.
Studies Working Paper No. RP07-03), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=950583.
125 This might be particularly relevant to small startups that may not be able to afford
multiple teams of attorneys.
126. See Dov Greenbaum, An Analysis of the Evolution of the Written Description
Requirement vis-à-vis DNA and Biotechnological Inventions, 1 RECENT PATS ON DNA &
GENE SEQUENCES 138 (2007).
127. Jane S. Shaw, Public Choice Theory, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ECONOMICS, http://www.econlib.org/library/enc/PublicChoiceTheory.html (citing James
Buchanan) (last visited Dec. 26, 2007).
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act in ways that are costly to individual citizens; e.g., by logrolling.
Although judiciaries would seemingly lack the same incentives
that politicians have to listen to public interest groups, they nonetheless
also tend to be captured by the interests of lobbyists. Public choice
explains this seeming inconsistency by noting that even judiciaries are
strongly inclined to act in the best interests of their stated mission to
remain within Congress’s favor and retain accesses to funding. This
reliance on a congressionally prescribed mission makes the judiciary and
129
agencies appear to be captured to the lobbyists and industries as well.
In the case of the Federal Circuit, it sees its mission as
“promoting technological progress by enlarging patent rights” in the
interests of the patent holders; and, according to Landes and Posner,
this mission-oriented specialized court is “a consequence largely of
130
interest-group politics.”
Without real knowledge of the actual mindsets of the Federal
Circuit justices we can only speculate as to their motivations.
Nevertheless, applying public choice theory, particularly in the context
of other recent decisions, we can make some educated guesses. In
Seagate and other current cases, this Comment suggests that the court
was responding to concerns from the hi-tech sector in particular.
Patent trolls, a term coined by Peter Detkin of Intel, typically refers
to a person or corporation that while owning intellectual property does
not manufacture anything but rather finds revenue in either licensing its
131
IP or asserting its patents through litigation: “[S]omeone who makes
money by extorting a license from the manufacturer who allegedly has
infringed the patent. Fearing the possibility of an injunction will force
132
the manufacture to cease operations, the company settles.”
Patent trolls are seen as a menace, particularly by the high tech
industry—filing lawsuits without warning, seeking license fees, and
threatening injunctions. And, consistently, these lawsuits plead willful
infringement on the part of the defendant. Given the often centrality of
128. Id.
129. Leon Felkins, Introduction to Public Choice, http://perspicuity.net/sd/pubchoice.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2007).
130. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 26-27, available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040608_
Landes.pdf.
131 See, generally, Patent Trolls:
Fact Or Fiction?:
Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, And Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006).
132 Id. at 1.

2008] WAIVER AS A RESULT OF COUNSEL’S OPINION LETTER

183

the purportedly infringed intellectual property to the defendant’s
business, the defendant will most likely continue to ‘infringe’
throughout the case. With the significant expenses involved in
133
litigation, many defendants would rather settle.
Seagate, it would seem, as well as other recent cases, would reflect
the Federal Circuit’s directed response to patent trolls, particularly in
response to concerns from the hi-tech sector. The biotech sector—with
relatively fewer patents in their portfolios and with generic competitors
that often do actually willfully infringe—may see less of a benefit
134
coming out of the Seagate decision.
Over the last couple of decades technology companies have been
amassing large arsenals of patents, not generally to assert against their
competitors, but rather as a defensive tool in an ongoing game of
brinkmanship: no large company would dare assert a patent against
their competitor, as that competitor could easily find a patent in their
own portfolio that they use in a return salvo on the plaintiff. This
situation was often compared to the mutually assured destruction
135
scenario of the Cold War.
In recent years Patent Trolls, principally in the hi-tech industry, have
upset this delicate balance; in 2007 alone, trolls have been primarily
responsible for the projected thirty percent increase in litigants sued for
136
Buying up large patent portfolios and asserting
patent infringement.
them against large and wealthy corporations, these tolls have made a
business model out of threats of expensive litigation. The mutually
assured destruction model of yore will not work against these guerilla
tactics; without a manufacturing base, trolls have little to lose by threats
of counter attacks from their opponents.

133 Id. at 21 (statement of Paul Misener). The “multi-million dollar barrier to even
challenge patent validity or infringement (and then only to a jury that is unlikely to
understand the technology) provides huge troll shakedown-settlement opportunities by
contingent fee tort lawyers which are rapidly being increasingly exploited.” Posting of Paul
Morgan, Guest Commentary on Why Patent Reform Needed to Patent Troll Tracker
http://trolltracker.blogspot.com/2007_11_01_archive.html (Nov. 28. 2007).
134. See Jeremiah S. Helm, Comment, Why Pharmaceutical Firms Support Patent
Trolls: The Disparate Impact of Ebay v. Mercexchange on Innovation 13 MICH. TELECOMM.
TECH. L. REV. 331, 338-43 (2006), for a theory as to why biotech and pharmaceutical
companies support patent trolls.
135 See supra text accompanying note 119. See also Col. Alan J. Parrington, USAF,
Mutually Assured Destruction Revisited Strategic Doctrine in Question, AIRPOWER J Winter
1997), at 4, 6.
136. Posting A Call for the Senate to Pass Patent Reform to Patent Troll Tracker
http://trolltracker.blogspot.com/2007_11_01_archive.html (Nov. 9, 2007).
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Seagate can be seen as an effort to fix many of the problems
encountered in these instances by the high tech companies.
The setting of a high objective bar to finding an instance of willful
infringement can be seen as a direct attack on trolls. A finding of willful
infringement and the concomitant treble damages is part of what makes
patent litigation so rewarding and enticing to trolls. The bar now makes
it more expensive for a troll to assert willful infringement, requiring
actual proof of willfulness prior to making the claim, and it makes it less
likely that an unsuspecting non-malicious defendant will be found to
137
have objectively willfully infringed.
Further, throwing out the duty of affirmative care makes it much
easier for large corporations to exist in the face of a vast and virtually
unknowable array of patents and submarine patents that could be
asserted against them at anytime. Note that the loss of the affirmative
duty of care would probably not affect the epic battles between massive
patent portfolios that essentially ignored the duty of care from the
outset, replacing it with assurances that “no matter what you assert
against me, I can assert something against you.”
Until Seagate, companies would be held liable for willful
infringement if they kept up infringing production during the case.
Seagate negates this by ruling that the basis for willful infringement must
occur prior to litigation; corporations are safe to continue production
138
without fear of increased damages.
Seagate, by limiting the instances where waiver would occur as a
result of an opinion letter—the first and cheapest line of defense against
a threatening troll—limits the ability of trolls, who may not have the
best counsel, to unfairly garnish information from defendant’s
139
counsel.
Further, the risk and costs of additional litigation dealing
with the extant and scope of the waiver, a perennial issue in many cases,
could be used by the trolls as a further form of intimidation—forcing
companies to settle rather than to go through protracted and potentially
revealing litigation.
Finally, limiting waiver instances mostly to where chicanery has
occurred will further hamper a troll’s effort to intimidate. An assertion
of chicanery by a troll may be a dangerous move: given the inherent
hypocrisy in a troll raising the claim if chicanery, such a claim could
raise the ire of the court.
137. See supra text accompanying note 103.
138. See supra text accompanying note 102.
139. See supra text accompanying note 113.
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These assertions of a direct attack on trolls by the Federal Circuit
are not founded on the Seagate decision alone. More recent case law
would also suggest this direction by the Federal Circuit. On September
20, 2007 the court issued two simultaneous rulings that reduced the
140
141
scope of patentable inventions: In re Comiskey and In re Nuijten
both try to cabin what can be patentable under the rubric of a business
method patent. Business method patents have become a growing
concern for those that are threatened by trolls. “The PTO has issued
thousands of [business method] patents . . . littering the business
landscape with land mines for unsuspecting companies and their
142
CIOs.”
Patent trolls holding an inventory of business method patents
pose a particular risk to modern day businesses. . . . [A]lmost any
business is susceptible to an attack by a patent troll.
Business method patents are also very difficult to invalidate
based on what was known at the time of the patent application
. . . . even for inventions that feel like they have been around
forever, it may be very hard to find the proof needed to prove
143
the patent invalid in court.
The court in In re Comiskey, where the litigant tried to patent a
method of arbitrating, limited the scope of business methods patents,
noting that patents cannot “be issued on particular business systems—
such as a particular type of arbitration—that depend entirely on the use
of mental processes. . . . [T]he law does not allow patents on particular
144
systems that depend for their operation on human intelligence alone.”
The court further ruled that the trivial association of the unpatentable
140. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
141. In re Nuitjen, 500 F.3d 1346 (2007).
142. Rob Garretson, Intellectual Security: Patent Everything You Do, Before Someone
Else Does, at http://www.cioinsight.com/print_article2/0,1217,a=167502,00.asp (Dec. 5, 2005)
(last visited Dec. 26, 2007).
Congress can further reduce the power of the patent troll by enacting legislation to
that effect. Some potential reforms that Congress may adopt in an effort to reduce
the power of patent trolls include improving the review of business- method patents,
weakening the presumption of validity for business- method patents, eliminating the
submarine patent, and providing that a court consider the patent troll's actual
contribution to the overall product or service when determining the extent of
monetary or equitable relief.
Damian Myers, Note, Reeling In The Patent Troll: Was Ebay v. Mercexchange
Enough?, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 333, 348-49 (2007).
143 Sarah Chapin Columbia & Stacy L. Blasberg, Beware Patent Trolls, RISK
MANAGEMENT, Apr. 2006, at 22, 24.
144. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d at1378.
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mental process with a machine will still not make the claim patentable.
Similarly in In re Nuijten, where the claim was for a signal containing
a watermark, the court further limited the scope of business method
146
patents.
“If a claim covers material not found in any of the four
statutory categories, that claim falls outside the plainly expressed scope
147
of § 101 even if the subject matter is otherwise new and useful.”
The details of the cases are beyond the scope of this Comment.
Suffice it to say it seems like the court, following in the footsteps of
Seagate’s attack on trolls on behalf of the high tech industry was further
raining on the troll parade by reigning in the scope of patentable subject
matter, particularly in the areas often frequented by patent trolls in their
148
litigations against high technology companies.
Without actual discussion with the Federal Circuit, it remains
uncertain whether any of the above is the actual reasoning behind
Seagate’s expansive and potentially unnecessary ruling. In light of this,
the final section of this Comment will look to alternatives that the
Federal Circuit might have chosen and could still apply to deal with
some of the aforementioned issues.
VII. POLICY OPTIONS
As noted earlier, there may continue to be a need for opinion letters
in patent litigation.
149
The whole question should have been moot after Knorr Bremse.
Given the potential damage that waiver might cause, why would a
defendant ever assert an opinion of counsel defense? Unfortunately,
statistics show that without an opinion of counsel defense, a defendant
150
will more often than not be found to have willfully infringed.
This
145. Id. at 1380. Note that like Seagate, the court dealt with the issue of patentable
subject matter sua sponte; it was not at issue either during the prosecution of the patent or on
appeal.
146. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1348.
147. Id. at 1354.
148 Note interestingly historical similarities to early instances of opportunistic patent
litigation: “In the nineteenth century, Congress eliminated this risk by wiping out the patents
that were fueling opportunistic litigation. This suggests that abolition may be the only
solution for modern trolls, at least with respect to patents for business methods and
software.” Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries And Barnyards: Patent Trolls And The Perils
Of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1813 (2007).
149. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[An] adverse inference that an opinion of counsel was or would have
been unfavorable . . . is no longer warranted.”).
150. Moore, supra note 70, at 239.
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may remain to be the case even after Seagate given the uncertainties
introduced by juries who may become suspicious if an opinion of
counsel is not produced at trial.
Of greatest concern are the chilling effects on trial counsel’s
interactions with the defendant when much of their privileged
discussions could come to light during discovery. Without a clear
definition of what would amount to an exceptional circumstance, or
even chicanery, there still exists a concern that a trial court will waive
trial counsel’s privilege and immunity.
It is unlikely that risk adverse corporations will, in response to
Seagate, desist from obtaining opinion letters as absent a clearly
erroneous decision, the Federal Circuit is unlikely to overrule a finding
151
of willfulness by the trial courts. And, without a clearer definition of
the newly created standards in Seagate, trial courts could potentially be
all over the map in determining willfulness. With this uncertainty,
potential infringers may continue to look to trial counsel for their
opinions—creating further instances where trial counsel may have their
privileges and immunities waived.
A. Bifurcation of Trials
The obvious choice for limiting the effects of waiver, and hinted to in
152
the Seagate decision is the bifurcation of trials.
This involves
separating out the determination of willfulness after the court has
determined that infringement has taken place, thus limiting any damage
153
caused by waiver to the second, less important half of the case. Often
this would also mean staying discovery of evidence related to
154
willfulness. Practically, this does not seem to be a viable option. Most

151. Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersystems Indus. Prods., Inc., 897 F.2d 508,510 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(“Whether infringement is willful is a question of fact, findings on which are reviewable under
the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a), Fed.R.Civ.P.”).
152. See, e.g., Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp., 940 F.2d 642, 644 (Fed Cir. 1991)
(suggesting that “[t]rial courts thus should give serious consideration to a separate trial on
willfulness[,]” particularly when faced with issues of waiver). Note, however, that while
“[t]he decision to bifurcate a trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court . . . [and
that] bifurcation of trials is not unusual and may under appropriate circumstances be the
preferred method, [nevertheless,] bifurcation remains the exception rather than the rule.”
Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Apotex Corp., No. 02 CIV. 8917, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11382, at
*4-5 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2004) (citation omitted).
153. “The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate
trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim . .
. or of any separate issue . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b).
154. Courts have been even more unwilling to stay discovery. See, e.g., Johns Hopkins
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cases end up not being bifurcated, and (anecdotally) most motions for
156
bifurcation are refused, possibly due to the perceived expense and
157
time constraints involved in holding a second jury trial. It is unclear if
this will change following Seagate.
B. Minimize the Offensive Use of Willfulness
One way to deal with the waiver issue is to lessen the chance that
Univ. v. CellPro, 160 F.R.D. 30, 36 (D. Del. 1995)
It is understandable that those involved in patent litigation would want to minimize
the risk of harm from this problem and would look to the Rules of Civil Procedure
for possible solutions. . . .
. . . [S]taying discovery on the advice of counsel defense and ordering a separate trial
on willfulness or damages is not a particularly efficient or effective solution. Staying
discovery on communications relating to the advice of counsel until after liability
has been established builds difficult delays and complications into the case. . . . [I]t
precludes the possibility of granting a summary judgment on the willfulness claim . .
. . It assumes that following a decision on liability and damages the court will need
to suspend the trial and establish a new schedule under Rule 16 for completion of
discovery on willfulness. The court would then need to hold a second pretrial
conference and enter a second pretrial order with an identification of documents to
be offered into evidence and witnesses to be called to testify on the willfulness
issues. Thereafter, the court would recall the jury and hold a second trial.
This stop-and-start of a stay of discovery and separate trials undermines our goal of
working to apply the Rules of Civil Procedure to obtain a just, speedy and
inexpensive resolution of every action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. It is not in the
interests of justice to make these adjustments to our procedures for litigating cases
to solve this problem.
Id.
155. See, e.g., Willemijn Houdstermaatschaapij BV v. Apollo Computer, Inc., 707 F.
Supp. 1429, 1434-35 (D. Del. 1989) (“[C]ourts are less likely to grant bifurcation when the
issues to be decided are not particularly complex” and that “[t]he burden of showing a
significant risk of confusion is on the party requesting bifurcation.”). See also Calmar, Inc. v.
Emson Research, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 861, 866 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (denying a motion for
bifurcation, noting that “[b]ifurcation of the issue of willfulness and a stay of discovery would
only complicate the instant proceedings and cause needless delay”).
156. The anecdotal evidence implies that courts rarely bifurcate. The reality actually
demonstrates otherwise: “The issue of willfulness was bifurcated in 48.6% of the bench trials
and 21.7% of the jury trials” between 1999 and 2000. Moore, supra note 70, at 235 (further
noting that bifurcating a trial can also, counter intuitively, save time and money).
Nevertheless, one reason that bifurcation is not as popular as it seems is that “when
bifurcation is granted, it is bifurcation of the trials only, not bifurcation of discovery.” Id. at
236. Thus, opposing counsel still retains access to potentially privileged discussion and
documents throughout the trial.
157. Note, however, that a jury trial is not required. See John B. Pegram, The Willful
Patent Infringement Dilemma and the 7th Amendment, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
271, 272 (2004) (suggesting that the Seventh Amendment requirement for a jury trial does not
apply to the determination of willful infringement once a determination of infringement has
already occurred).
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waiver will ever arise during trial by minimizing or removing the
possibility of a willful infringement offense. A claim of willful
158
infringement is made in almost every patent suit, and as long as it is
relatively risk free to do so, patentees will probably continue to make
the claim.
In addition to the potential chilling effects on innovation resulting
from the current status of the law regarding willful infringement, there is
also a growing concern that the possibility of collecting compensation
159
In fact many lawyers now
for attorneys’ fees has inflated those fees.
160
consider willful infringement as the main cost component in a suit.
With the continued uncertainty of being found willfully infringing,
businesses can never accurately determine whether it would be
161
economically efficient to infringe, an unfortunate necessity.
1. Removing Willfulness
The Federal Trade Commission noted that some scholars
recommended abolishing the doctrine and recommended that it at least
162
be reigned in.
Similarly, the NAS Report also suggested that the
163
doctrine be either abolished entirely or severely curtailed: “there has
been no empirical demonstration that the availability of enhanced
damages provides substantial additional deterrence over and above that
associated with the usual costs and risks of defending an infringement
164
claim.” Notwithstanding these opinions, there are valid concerns that
the abolishment of the willful infringement doctrine will create perverse
disincentives for infringers to take a license, or to license immediately,
165
as opposed to licensing the patent only after one loses the lawsuit.

158. Moore, supra note 70, at 232 (finding alleged willful infringement in 92.3% of
approximately 1700 patent infringement lawsuits). Moore reinforces the concern that
infringement is claimed somewhat frivolously, noting that typically willful infringement is
claimed in all the individual patents at issue in patent litigation. Id.
159. See, e.g., id. at 227 n.3 (noting an award of attorneys’ fees of $5,044,140.40 in
Precor Inc. v. Life Fitness, an amount slightly less than the actual value of the infringement).
160. NAS Report, supra note 54 (citing an AIPLA report at 123).
161. Note that this may not be a bad thing. The law never considers infringement to be
good.
162. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, TO
PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND
POLICY 242 (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
163. NAS Report, supra note 54, at 7.
164. Id. at 119.
165. This position has been described as “heads-I-win, tails-you-lose.” Panduit Corp.
v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 (6th Cir. 1978).
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Creating criminal liability for infringement, as is the case in other
166
major patent offices, may minimize these incentives.
Alternatively, a
judge could decrease liability in cases where someone is merely
167
negligent as opposed to willful. Note that this direction will also help
168
repair a schism between patent law and the rest of American law by
removing the ability of courts to find willfulness in even negligent
169
infringement.
2. Disincentivizing the Usage of Willfulness
Willfulness will probably continue to be asserted in patent
infringement cases: Limiting the type of infringers that could be found
to be willfully infringing, or limiting the most egregious damage awards
to actual pirates, and applying a lesser punishment to independent
inventors of the infringing product, may limit the usage of willful
170
infringement.
Alternatively, Congress could legislate independent
invention as an affirmative defense to infringement.
While the independent invention defense has not gotten much
traction in American patent law reform, it does exist in some other
171
172
jurisdictions.
Such a defense may help improve patent quality and
166. See, e.g., Norio Komuro, Japan’s Patent Law Amendment on Remedies against
Patent Infringement, 1 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 263, 263 (1998); Patent Litigation in China,
http://www.ladas.com/Litigation/ForeignPatentLitigation/ChinaPR_Patent_Litigation.html
(last visited Dec. 26, 2007).
167. See, e.g., Germany.
168. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
1337, 1351 n.88 (Dyk, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part) (citation omitted).
Patent law is not an island separated from the main body of American
jurisprudence. The same requirement of reprehensibility restricts an award of
enhanced damages in patent cases as in other cases. When an infringer merely fails
to exercise his supposed duty of care, there are none of the circumstances ordinarily
associated with egregiously improper conduct that could be sufficiently
reprehensible to warrant imposition of punitive damages.
Id.
169. See generally Stephanie Pall, Note, Willful Patent Infringement: Theoretically
Sound? A Proposal To Restore Willful Infringement to its Proper Place Within Patent Law,
2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 659, 659 (2006).
170. This is currently the case in other forms of intellectual property including
copyright and trade secret. See, e.g., Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The
Independent Invention Defense in Intellectual Property, 69 ECONOMICA 535, 535 (2002). In
addition to lessening the usage of willfulness as an offense, the threat of entry to the market
by an independent inventor would create an inducement for the patentee to license the
technology, which, in turn, would lower the market price of the invention. Id.
171. Germany has such a defense called Vorbenutzungsrecht, although it carries
somewhat limited rights. German Patent Act §12.1 See also Samson Vermont, Independent
Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475 (2006).
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would also reduce the wasting of resources that occurs when firms run
duplicate and parallel research and development operations in a patent
173
race.
174
While there are some problems with this defense, and the defense
may be hard to prove, it could piggyback on the methods for
determining the first to invent and in copyright where independent
creation is a defense to infringement.
3. Disincentivizing Willful Infringement
The threat of a permanent injunction against egregious, willful
infringement would force many of the putative infringers to license
175
rather than going to trial. However, the recent eBay ruling may limit
176
the applicability of this option. After eBay, plaintiffs can no longer be
certain that a court will grant a permanent injunction against an
infringer, who, without the threat of a finding of willful infringement,
may continue to infringe until a final court decision disallowing it.
C. Redefining the Privileged Nature of an Opinion Letter
Defendants might think about asserting that the production of an
opinion letter ought not be considered a waiver of privilege; it does not
relate to the information that privilege is designed to protect. The
177
touchstone of the privilege is that of an expectation of confidentiality.
But as recent articles and cases have pointed out, the opinion letter is
now a component of the business practice, even a game between
172. Obvious inventions will not be patented since there may be many others who
independently invented, and the potential for significant royalties from the initial obvious
invention would thereby be limited. See, e.g., Jackson Lenford, Right to Create,
http://righttocreate.blogspot.com/2005/11/independent-invention-defense.html (Nov. 4, 2005
11:22).
173. See id.
174. An obvious example is the drug development pipeline, where one inventor can go
through hundreds of potential hits before arriving at the drug, while a second can
serendipitously arrive at the drug much sooner.
175. See Harold A. Borland, The Affirmative Duty To Exercise Due Care In Willful
Patent Infringement Cases: We Still Want It, 6 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 175, 186-87 (2005).
176. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006) (“The decision
whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district
courts, and that such discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional principles of
equity, in patent disputes no less than in other cases governed by such standards.”).
177. “It is vital to a claim of privilege that the communications between client and
attorney were made in confidence and have been maintained in confidence.” In re Horowitz,
482 F.2d 72, 82 (2nd Cir. 1973) (requiring the court to be persuaded that documents are
intended to remain confidential).
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litigants; it is created and produced principally to show the adversarial
party, if the patent was ever to be litigated, that infringement was not
179
willful. To say that such a document, designed primarily to be used as
180
an exhibit in trial and often not representing a legitimate opinion,
would destroy attorney-client privilege by its divulgence seems to be
unjustifiable, unfair, and illogical. Privilege never attached to the
181
document, so how could it destroy privilege for privileged documents
182
and discussion?
Nevertheless, courts, focused on theoretical, rigid,
178. See Mosel Vitelic Corp. v. Micron Tech., Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 307, 312 (D. Del.
2000) (explaining that there is a legitimate concern that
patent attorneys [are encouraged] to deliberately omit damaging information from
their opinion letters in order to insulate their clients from a finding of willful
infringement. Furthermore, because both attorney and client know why the advice
of counsel is being sought, their relationship has the potential to be premised upon
the understanding (whether explicit or implicit) that only favorable information
should be disclosed.
(emphasis added)). Compare Geoffrey Shipsides, Advocacy or Counsel: The Continuing
Dual Role of Written Infringement Opinion Letters and the Failure of Knorr-Bremse to
Confine the Role of Patent Attorneys Issuing Written Infringement Opinion Letters, 18 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1069, 1070 (2005)
These infringement opinion letters ostensibly have the purpose of giving the
potential infringer advice as to whether they are infringing the patent in question.
The infringement opinion has the second potential use of being produced as
evidence at trial of the potential infringer's state of mind for the determination of
willful infringement. Patent attorneys, aware of this possible evidentiary use of
infringement opinion letters, know that the letter is also the place to advocate for
their client's position of non-infringement.
Id. (emphasis added), with Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(the Federal Circuit expects from an opinion letter, requiring that the “opinion must be
thorough enough, as combined with other factors, to instill a belief in the infringer that a
court might reasonably hold the patent is invalid, not infringed, or unenforceable.”). See
also Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1572-73 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting the “affirmative
duty of due care that normally requires the potential infringer to obtain competent legal
advice before infringing or continuing to infringe. The emphasis here must be on competent
legal advice. . . . If infringers could rely on any opinion to defeat willful infringement, no
matter how incompetent, insulation from increased damages would be complete”) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
179. Lemley & Tangri, supra note 53, at 1104 (“Opinions of counsel, in short, aren't
unvarnished legal advice. They exist for show.”).
180. “[A]ccused infringers who are aware of these rules respond to such letters by
obtaining a sort of pseudo-legal advice that both they and their attorneys recognize to be a
construct. Both plaintiffs and defendants are playing a costly game.” Id. at 1087.
181. “For the attorney-client privilege to attach to a communication, it must have been
made in confidence and for the purpose of securing or conveying legal advice. The privilege
evaporates the moment that confidentiality ceases to exist.” XYZ Corp. v. United States, 348
F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
182. Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit ruled that “a party does not waive the attorneyclient privilege for documents which he is compelled to produce.” Transamerica Computer
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and absolute notions of fairness and the potential to use privilege as
183
both a sword and shield, might not allow this claim.
D. Selective Waiver
An alternative is the creation of a selective waiver doctrine for an
184
opinion of counsel defense. Selective waiver is usually associated with
disclosure of privileged documents and information to government
agencies, e.g., waiver of information to the SEC does not waive
185
privilege.
186
The Eighth Circuit ruled in Diversified Industries Inc. v. Meredith
that “voluntary surrender of privileged material to a governmental
agency in obedience to an agency subpoena [does not] constitute[ ] a
187
waiver of the privilege for all purposes,” noting in particular a fear
that interpreting such disclosure to be a waiver “may have the effect of
thwarting the developing procedure of corporations to employ
188
While
independent outside counsel to investigate and advise them.”

Co. v. IBM, 573 F.2d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 1978) (emphasis in original). Thus disclosure of the
letter may not waive the rest of the privilege.
183. See, e.g., Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., No. 04-84-GFVT,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40612, at *20 (E.D. Ky. June 15, 2006) (noting that an opinion letter
“was a privileged communication to SCC, irrespective of the fact that SCC is now trying to
label the Blakey Letter as a non-privileged communication. A rose by any other name smells
the same.”). Static Control can be distinguished, however, from the idea presented above: in
Static Control the defendant claimed the document was unprivileged as it was not prepared as
an opinion letter. I argue that even if it was prepared by an attorney as an opinion letter, it
ought not to be perceived as privileged.
184. Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 604 (8th Cir. 1977). While selective
waiver seems to be generally disliked by many circuits, see, e.g. In re John Doe Corp., 675
F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982) and Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Columbia/Hca
Healthcare Corp. (in Re Columbia/Hca Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig.), 293 F.3d
289 (6th Cir. 2002). Patent law does have its own inconsistent degree of selectiveness in
applying waiver and loss of immunity. Courts typically cabin the waiver in terms of time and
subject matter.
185. The case of selective waiver is somewhat confusing.
See, e.g., In re
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Pracs. Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 294-95 (6th Cir. 2002).
[T]he case law addressing the issue of limited waiver is in a state of hopeless
confusion. Indeed, . . . some courts have even taken internally inconsistent opinions.
A review of the positions presented by the various courts reveals three general
opinions on the issue–selective waiver is permissible, selective waiver is not
permissible under any situations, and selective waiver is permissible in situations
where the Government agrees to a confidentiality order.
Id. (citations omitted).
186. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
187. Id. at 604 n.1.
188. Id. at 611.
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most if not all other circuit courts have refused to recognize selective
189
waiver, one could make the case for allowing it in this particular
190
situation. Instead of framing the selectiveness of the waiver as only a
waiver to a third party, perhaps the Federal Circuit can see this waiver
as a very narrow subject matter waiver, that of only (but all) opinion
191
letters referencing the opinion of counsel as to non-infringement.
The Federal Circuit in discussing selective waiver noted that it “has
192
never recognized such a limited waiver,” and other circuits are loathe
to allow the tactical use of waiver, noting that because the incorporation
of a waiver into the litigation process “inhibits the truth-finding process,
it has been narrowly construed, and courts have been vigilant to prevent
litigants from converting the privilege into a tool for selective
193
disclosure.”
Selective waiver should be all the more relevant in instances where
there is the potential for waiver of the work product doctrine. The
District of Columbia Circuit in particular noted that
the work product privilege does not exist to protect a
confidential relationship, but rather to promote the adversary
system by safeguarding the fruits of an attorney’s trial
189. See, e.g., United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 685 (1st Cir. 1997)
(criticizing the Eighth Circuit for not giving this decision more than “a paragraph of
analysis”). See also In re Columbia Healthcare, 293 F.3d at 302 (where the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit “reject[s] the concept of selective waiver, in any of its
various forms”); Genentech, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 122 F.3d 1409, 1417
(Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 1993); Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1424 (3d Cir. 1991); In re Martin
Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 623-24 (4th Cir. 1988); Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d
1214, 1220-21 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
190. See, e.g., Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Columbia/Hca Healthcare
Corp. (in Re Columbia/Hca Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig.), 293 F.3d 289, 295 (6th
Cir. 2002) (acknowledging the split of opinions regarding selective waiver: “the case law
addressing the issue of limited waiver is in a state of hopeless confusion. Indeed, some courts
have even taken internally inconsistent opinions”).
191. The disclosure of one opinion letter would force the waiver of all opinion letters,
thus limiting the ability of the defendant to disclose only those opinions favorable to her
position, but nevertheless preventing the disclosure of trial counsel privileged documents and
discussions.
192. Genentech, 122 F.3d at 1417.
193. Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221 (citation omitted) (noting that the attorney-client
privilege is not designed for such tactical employment). See also the D.C. Circuit’s follow-up
opinion, In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“A client
cannot waive . . . [the] privilege in circumstances where disclosure might be beneficial while
maintaining it in other circumstances where nondisclosure would be beneficial. . . . [T]he
attorney-client privilege should be available only at the traditional price: a litigant who
wishes to assert confidentiality must maintain genuine confidentiality.”) (citation omitted).
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preparation from the discovery attempts of an opponent. A
disclosure made in the pursuit of such trial preparation, and not
inconsistent with maintaining secrecy against opponents, should
194
be allowed without waiver of the privilege.
The courts’ acceptance of this selective waiver may hinge on how
they view privilege.
Are privilege and immunity principally
impediments to truth finding, or is their promotion of unfettered
discussion between client and attorney of primary importance? I would
195
argue the latter. Additionally, and particularly in the present case, the
calculus of the courts with regard to waiver—that waiver implies that
196
the privilege incentive was never necessary— would not apply; without
197
producing an opinion of counsel letter, the litigant is likely to lose.
CONCLUSION
It’s all a game until someone gets hurt. Given the true nature of
willfulness as an offensive tactic, and of the opinion of counsel letter as a
defense to this tactic, it is hard to understand how courts in an
adversarial system can so flippantly waive privilege and immunity.
Moreover, contrary to all precedential rulings, an opinion of counsel will
probably remain an important component of the defense against willful
infringement for the foreseeable future.
With the continued uncertainty whether the divulgence of an
opinion of counsel could waive a broad range of trial counsel’s privilege
and immunities, there are concerns of a chilling effect on important

194. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d at 1371 (emphasis omitted).
195. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Pracs. Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 309 (6th
Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting)
[T]he calculation is that the attorney-client privilege improves the adversarial
process without a net loss in the amount of information produced. Insofar as the
existence of the privilege creates the communication sought, the exclusion of
privileged information conceals no probative evidence that would otherwise exist
without the privilege. The absence of the communication would leave the
adversarial process with no more information and with counsel less able to present
focused arguments to the courts.
Id.
196. “If clients themselves divulge such information to third parties, chances are that
they would also have divulged it to their attorneys, even without the protection of the
privilege. Thus, once a client has revealed privileged information to a third party, the basic
justification for the privilege no longer applies.” Westinghouse Electronic Corp. v. Republic
of Philippines 951 F.2d 1414, 1424 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Comment, Stuffing the Rabbit Back
into the Hat: Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege in an Administrative Agency
Investigation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1198, 1207 (1982)).
197. See Moore, supra note 70.
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disclosures and discussions between the defendant and trial counsel as
litigants continue to develop more elaborate ruses to prevent the
disclosure of information subsequent to waiver.
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